Abstract
Introduction
How should we interpret such recent rural policy developments as reforms to reduce peasant tax burden, initiatives to build "Socialist New Villages", or the quest to the search for a "Green GDP" index? 4 larger capacity to address the needs of the rural population, and considerable resources have been allocated to these regards. 2-13; Xiang Jingquan, "Introduction: The rural tax-for-fee reform -a yet-to-complete revolution", Numerous studies have elucidated the historical and institutional embeddedness of the "peasant burden" problem. 8 The consensus is that fees proliferated out of historically grounded institutional mismatches, in particular between the growing needs of local bureaucracies and their limited ability to finance themselves through existing fiscal channels, and not exclusively because of local corruption. The fiscal system had incrementally evolved as the country edged away from central planning. During this process, necessary local (and rural)
services were left largely unfunded whilst the size of township administration snowballed, partly as a result of policies, regulations, appointments and actions of higher levels of government, and partly as a by-product of lackluster economic had intentionally weakened the township or even pre-planned the demise of township government from the beginning of the rural tax reforms, as part of a "master plan" to eliminate a major cause of excessive extraction. 21 An affirmative answer would be in line with a "top-down" conception of the reform process.
There are prima facie indications of a top-down "central project" to weed out the townships. Ongoing reforms designed to contain extra-budgetary and offbudget local revenues, for example, have tightened up fiscal monitoring from above. In some provinces the salaries of state-workers, such as school teachers, had already become a county responsibility prior to the rural tax reform. This picture, however, is less neat and tidy if the agency of local actors is considered. Rather than dictating the reform, the central government failed to act at critical junctures, and relied on provinces and localities to fill the gap.
Whatever effects the rural tax reform had on rural services, these were a product, 23 Like other tax reform measures, the practice of "xiangcai xianguan" (county governments 228-58. At the same time, one should also say that while malpractices can be common at each level of government, local officials' malpractices are easier to spot. So this "perception" is not entirely the result of "active" scapegoatism.
Top-Down Pressures
allowing it additional space to review and correct failing policies. Ironically, the central government needs the independence of local cadres for this process to work. Local cadres implement risky policies so that the centre can claim these that work and scapegoat lower levels when they fail.
This policy process was not simply a matter of a wicked centre wishing to abandon its responsibility. It also reflected policy contention at the highest levels.
A veteran provincial level official involved in the reform process offered the following observation:
"We in the provinces know very well-that the tax-for-fee reform is merely the starting point, a window from which to gradually dismantle the multi-faceted institutional and policy constraints against the peasants. But One notable indication of this gross neglect at the centre was the needless policy reversals that resulted from too much haste in the implementation process. was no intention to include in the calculation all the other miscellaneous local fees which, being unauthorized, were to be simply abolished. Local governments were expected to absorb the forgone revenues from these "illegitimate" fees by cutting "unnecessary" expenditure -for instance, by downsizing local bureaucracies. 33 The gap between these expectations and the practical situations in many townships was wide, and as noted previously, the actual situation in the townships was in fact well known amongst segments of intelligentsia and policy circles. The Ministry of Finance had relatively limited knowledge in the complex 32 Author's interviews with central fiscal officials, Beijing, 2002 Beijing, , 2004 33 See also Ren Bo, "How the (reform on) rural taxes and fees have evolved", which notes central policy makers' intention to use the revenue "deficit" to force the hands of township governments to downsize. details of rural affairs, as rural affairs had traditionally not been in its portfolio.
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The ministry's "blind spot" was ignored and existing knowledge elsewhere was not solicited despite the fact that a major policy was at stake. April, exactly one month after the 24 March Directive, to announce a "temporary halt to reform extension". For a while, the international media abounded with reports that the Chinese burden-reduction reforms had been aborted. clashes with peasants resulting in major roads/train lines being blocked or governments being attacked; 3) situations wherein force was used to collect taxes, or where peasants committed suicides.
24 from the implementation process. 48 Provinces also stepped up their monitoring of reform implementation. In the agricultural heartlands, where levies were known to be high, provincial inspection teams were dispatched to all counties. 49 The teams would normally stay in a county for a week to visit households and 53 A provincial source once commented that the most difficult part in reform implementation was to know exactly how much had been taken from peasants pre-reform, since "illegal", or "extrasystem", items were rarely carefully recorded. Nevertheless, he also agreed that due to the stepped-up post-reform monitoring, by and large peasant burden had been placed under control.
This view was widely shared by our interviewees across provinces. With less disposable resources we can only do much less."
This town is the site of the only foreign joint-venture in Shucheng County of Anhui, and had good access to inter-provincial roads. 54 It was thus better-off than neighbouring towns, so that the county had recently increased fiscal extractions from the town. But even in this "better off" town, the entire annual budget of 1.7 million yuan, including incoming fiscal subsidies, was sufficient only to pay for staff salaries and basic social security payments. 55 Developing the local economy further would have required new investments in roads and farmland irrigation. When monies were tight development was simply out of question. "The farthest we can set our sight on these days are minor projects of a 'remedial' nature, said the Party secretary. The officials elaborated that they had planned minor public works valued some 0.6-0.7 million yuan (over a year), but as a result of the reduced income they could only afford a third of them.
Such was the situation in a town with some industrial income and foreign investment, that was seen by the county as a "milk cow". In townships more dependent on agriculture, the "minimalist" approach to public expenditure often meant despair and resignation. In another town in a hilly region of Anhui Province, 56 town leaders were preoccupied not with choosing which public
The basic social security payments refer to those paid to the most vulnerable groups of rural residents, e.g. orphans, elderly without children, and disabled, in accordance with the "Regulation on providing for the 5-guarantees for the needy". Before the reform these payments were financed by a fee collected by the town government. The fee was abolished along with others as a result of the tax reform, and the payments had to come from the town budget coffers. after rural tax-for-fee reform was implemented, was around 1.3 million yuan, whilst expenditure was 2.7 million yuan, the balance financed by fiscal subsidies from above. The town was mostly dependent on agriculture and remittance income from outgoing migrant workers, though there was also some revenue from local trade, being in the middle of a "catchment" of neighboring towns (Author's interviews, 2002 forced to borrow money to pay for tasks that must be done as a matter of necessity, despite the post-reform dire fiscal situation. Third, we have numerous funding "gaps" in the day-to-day running of government offices, including staff salary, operation costs such as transport expenses, telephone and internet connection fees, and reception expenses. These are major concerns to us since they recur on a daily basis."
In this town, some components of staff salary had historically relied on extrabudgetary income. As extrabudgetary fees were prohibited under the reform, the town became heavily reliant on incoming transfers, which amounted to over half of its total outlay. Fiscal dependence appeared to have made township cadres more receptive towards further centralizing measures.
"I heard that the county-level will soon take over the payroll management of all township cadres. Last year they did that to our teachers.
Well, is it good? Yes, even though this will signal the substantive "death" "The current situation in our country is that the upper levels (central and provincial) are flooded with resources, whilst the local levels are left to struggle. The lower in the state hierarchy you go, the more difficult the situation is. We at the township level have the most to do, but the least to spend. This is irresponsible, as I see it. The result? -numerous tasks are left undone. It is futile for us even to protest. Nobody will listen. What makes it worse is that if anything within our township goes wrong, superiors will not examine why and how. They do not care whether we have done our duties properly. They will just hold us responsiblebecause things under our jurisdiction go wrong! This is what we call the "leadership responsibility system". Nobody would seriously care to find out if we have the resources or power to perform the assigned duties to start with. We are just to take the blame, we are the scape-goat…What could we in the township do to make our lives easier? Not much, really.
Everyday we walk on a tight rope. and make the township a branch office of the county, the upper levels will have to take over our current responsibilities. That would be a relief! We are then free of the burden of worrying over insufficient resources or being held responsible for tasks that are beyond our means. We can then focus our work on implementation."
The speed with which the national reform achieved its intended objective-as seen in high burden reduction rates -has brought to the foreground a central issue: whether villagers can prosper simply with a reduced level of extraction. As noted earlier, it was widely acknowledged within academic and policy circles that burden-reduction would need to be sustainable. The embedded nature of the burden issue, however, was lost in the policy phase. What needed to be "fixed" were problems in the implementation of policies at the lower levels:
counties and townships. Local officials were left with little choice but to comply, given their subordinate status in the state bureaucracy, and they coped, by passively "sitting through" their job. With resources barely sufficient to pay for salaries, public services were minimized, if provided at all. Some townships found it difficult just to maintain the government, Ironically, "to maintain the basic operations of grassroots-level government" was one of the three main 
Conclusion
This paper suggests that the central state has, as a result of elite competition and bureaucratic politics, simplistically attributed the hardships of rural life (low household income and low levels of public goods provision, etc.) to excessive local extraction. In turn, this extraction was explained by overstaffing and spending abuses in townships and villages. A complex and multi-faceted issue was reduced to one of maladministration and bad institutional designs at local levels. The beauty of this schema, from the perspective of central state actors, is that it absolved the central government of responsibility for rural suffering.
Supervision of local agents thus became a central aspect of the national reform program. A scapegoat was found, and then hunted down, and reform objectivesbettering the situation of the peasants-were proclaimed accomplished. 59 The other two objectives are reducing peasants' burden and sustaining the reduction, and maintaining the smooth functioning of rural schools and guarantee the pay of school teachers (Document No. 7, 2000) .
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Township cadres, the objects of the reform, defended their past practice and demanded superiors to play fair by paying up for its costs. They then utilized their advantage as implementers by tailoring reform details to their needs, maximizing job security and minimizing responsibilities. Paradoxically, the cumulative effect of the implementation maneuvers have been a fostering of the centrally defined objectives of the reform, as demonstrated in the higher than expected burden-reduction rates and the faster-than-scheduled pace of reform implementation nationwide. As reform approached its completion local state actors also tacitly accepted their dependency, leading to a collapse of township governance.
When local officials were deprived of the motivation, authority and resources to assume responsibility for local governance, upper levels were left with a choice between taking new measures or ignoring the need for action.
Lately, attempts to move to fiscal responsibility over education to the provincial level, and the "Socialist New Village" Program, aimed at making up for the public goods "deficit" in rural areas, suggest that more duties are being assumed by central and provincial governments. 60 Whether these will eventually work for rural residents and have any meaningful impact over the quality of rural 60 Provincial governments, rather than counties, would be made responsible for making sure that school education is properly funded when the proposed amendments to the Law on Compulsory governance remains to be seen. What this paper shows is that changes in rural fiscal practices were not the result of a central plan, but the outcome of a complex process that no one designed.
